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Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture

Choice of Law After the Currie
Revolution: What Role for the
Needs of the Interstate and
International Systems?'
by Gary J. Simson'
Mercer University School of Law, which dates back to 1873,' has had
many distinguished graduates in its long history.' In the realm of legal
scholarship, however, one graduate-Brainerd Currie-unquestionably
stands alone above them all. In the course of an academic career that
began in 1935 with two years at his alma mater and included substantially longer stints on the law faculties at Duke and the University of

t Copyright @2011 by Gary J. Simson.
* Dean and Macon Chair in Law, Mercer University. Yale College (B.A., 1971); Yale
Law School (J.D., 1974). This Article is based on remarks that I delivered on September
21, 2011, as the first Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture at Mercer University School of Law.
It is also a revised and expanded version of the essay that I contributed to LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN (Mahnoush

H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). I am grateful to my colleague Hal Lewis for various helpful
comments.
1. See Proven Heritage, MERCER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.mercer.edu/
about/heritage (last visited Dec. 14, 2011).
2. See Notable Alumni, MERCER UNIVERSITY, http://about.mercer.edu/notable-alumni/
(last visited Dec. 14,2011) (listing numerous Mercer Law graduates among the university's
"more notable alumni" in law, politics, education, the arts, and other fields).
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Chicago,' Currie transformed through his scholarship the field of
conflict of laws.
It is no exaggeration to say that Currie was the most influential
conflicts scholar of the last century. In fact, that claim probably
understates the case, because Currie was influential in his field in a way
that few scholars ever are in theirs. Not only did he change the way in
which other conflicts scholars thought about conflicts problems. Even
more impressively, he changed the way in which the great majority of
state supreme courts did so.' His writings, far more than anyone else's,
sparked what many have come to call a "revolution"5 in choice of law.
Ironically, one of the relatively few states to resist explicitly adopting his
insights is Georgia, 6 where he was born and educated and where he
launched his remarkable teaching career.'
I will discuss Currie's contributions with greater specificity when I
provide an overview of choice of law in Part I below. For now, I want to
underline his tremendous stature as a legal scholar and reformer,
because that stature is what prompted me in the spring of 2011-less
than a year after I came to Mercer to become dean-to help create the
lecture series that had, as its inaugural entry, the lecture on which this
Article is based. As one might expect in light of my many years teaching
and writing in conflict of laws, I had been thinking about ways of
honoring the memory of this extraordinary graduate almost from the
moment that I had the good fortune to be asked to join the Mercer law
faculty as dean. When the law school received some funding in early
2011 that the donor had designated as money to be allocated toward
lectures, I broached with Billie Pritchard, the Law Review's editor-inchief, and my conflicts colleague Hal Lewis, the longtime faculty advisor
to the Law Review, the idea of having an Annual Brainerd Currie
Lecture that the lecturer would agree to develop into an article for the
Mercer Law Review. I am grateful to both of them and to the entire Law

3.

See Elvin R. Latty, Brainerd Currie-Five Tributes, 1966 DUKE L.J. 2, 2. For a

wonderfully admiring and insightful essay on what made Currie "the model of excellence
for a generation of law professors," see Jack L. Sammons, BrainerdCurrie: I Am The Very
Model of a Modern Intellectual, 48 MERCER L. REV. 623 (1997).

4. See infra text accompanying notes 15-24.
5. See, e.g., Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 772, 772 (1983); Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of
Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 181 (1977).

6. See Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 279 Ga. 808, 621 S.E.2d 413 (2005) (reaffirming
Georgia's continued adherence to the traditional place-of-wrong rule, and explicitly
rejecting Currie's governmental interest analysis approach as well as other approaches that
build on Currie's insights but that do not focus exclusively on governmental interests).
7. See Latty, supra note 3, at 2.

20121

ANNUAL BRAINERD CURRIE LECTURE

717

Review board for embracing the idea and helping bring to realization
both the inaugural lecture and this Article.
My project in this Article concerns "choice of law"-that branch or
subset of the field of conflict of laws that seeks to determine the
applicable law in cases not confined in their elements to a single
jurisdiction." Specifically, I attempt to answer a question given little
attention by courts and scholars before Currie: What role should the
needs of the interstate and international systems play in choice of law?
Interestingly, although Currie himself had little to say on this question,
his scholarship was instrumental in clearing away the traditional-rules
thicket that was obscuring the question's importance.
After briefly discussing in Part I the current state of choice of law in
the United States and the place of interstate and international needs
within it, I turn my attention in the remainder of the Article to the
prescriptive question of the role that those needs should play. I explain
in Parts II and III the value of answering this question within the
framework of a forum-centered approach to choice of law. In Part IV I
discuss problems inherent in identifying interstate and international
needs, and in Part V I consider the difficulties entailed in determining
the degree to which such needs are implicated in particular cases. I
conclude in Part VI by returning to Currie and attempting to reconcile
his deservedly lofty stature in the field with his inattention to a concept
as important as the role of interstate and international needs.
Throughout the Article, I limit my focus to courts in the United States.
I should emphasize at the outset that I do so not because courts
elsewhere are any less interesting or important. They surely are not.
Rather, I do so because any attempt to address the question at hand is
most meaningful in the context of one or another particular court system
and because the U.S. court system is the one I know best.

8. Put somewhat differently, choice of law deals with cases that transcend, in their
parties or events, the boundaries of the forum state. If all aspects of a case are limited to
the forum state, the court has no need to reflect on which state's law(s) govern the issue(s)
in the case. Forum law obviously applies. When a case transcends the boundaries of the
forum state, however, some basis at least potentially exists for the court's choosing
nonforum law to decide one or more issues in the case. A court's "choice of law" approach
is the mechanism by which it determines which, of two or more potentially applicable laws,
should apply to each issue in the case. See GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS vii, 3 (4th ed. 2005). Unless I expressly indicate

otherwise, I use the terms "state" and "jurisdiction" interchangeably in this Article.
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AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. CHOICE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS

Broadly speaking, the history of choice of law in the courts of the
United States can be divided into two eras: before Babcock v. Jackson'
and after. Prior to Babcock-a 1963 decision by the New York Court of
Appeals-courts throughout the United States virtually uniformly framed
the choice-of-law analysis set forth in their written opinions in terms of
territorial rules of largely medieval origin. 0 Although the American
Law Institute had published in 1934 the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws" in hopes of generating widespread conformity among state
courts to a particular set of rules, 2 the rules-after 1934 as well as before-commonly varied from state to state at any one time and within a
single state over the years." At least on the surface, however, the
various sets of traditional rules all required courts to arrive at their
choice-of-law decisions indirectly. After characterizing the case at hand
as one in tort, contract, or another area of the law, the court would (1)
apply the place-of-wrong, place-of-making, or other rule triggered by the
characterization, (2) ascertain the jurisdiction identified by the rule, and
(3) with exceptions for forum procedures and forum public policy, apply
the law of the selected jurisdiction across the board.14
The New York Court of Appeals' pathbreaking opinion in Babcock was
the first state high court opinion to disavow strict adherence to the
traditional rules." In Babcock the court announced that it would no
longer feel bound to apply the place-of-wrong rule in tort cases." In
subsequent years, the great majority of state high courts did likewise,
and a similar proportion expressly renounced the traditional approach

9.

191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).

10. See SIMsoN, supra note 8, at 13.
11. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT].
12. See William Draper Lewis, Introduction to id. at viii-ix.
13. See SIMSON, supra note 8, at 13.
14. See id. at 13, 15.
15. For a sense of Babcock's historic importance in the development of choice of law,
see the contributions by Currie and other leading conflicts scholars of the time in
Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963), and the various perspectives offered by a later generation
of conflicts scholars in Symposium on Conflict of Laws: Celebratingthe 30th Anniversary
of Babcock v. Jackson, 56 ALB. L. REV. 693 (1993).
16. See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285 ("[Tihe rule, formulated as it was by the courts,
should be discarded.").
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in contract cases." In rejecting strict adherence to the place-of-wrong
rule, the Babcock court was able to draw support from earlier cases in
New York and elsewhere that had adhered to the traditional rules in
form but that could sensibly be understood as manipulating the rules to
reach results defensible in terms of unarticulated policy considerations.' As other state supreme courts declared their rejection of one
or another traditional rule, they typically offered a similar reinterpretation of past decisions, along with citation to cases in which other states'
high courts had explicitly rejected the rule."
Currie was central in two respects to state high courts' refusal in
Babcock and later cases to remain tied to the traditional rules. First, in
a virtual avalanche of articles between 1958 and 1963 in leading law
reviews across the country-articles collected into book form in 1963 for
publication by a leading university press 20-Currie leveled one after
another powerful attack on the logic of the traditional rules and exposed
their fundamental lack of "rational" justification.2 ' With razor-like
analytical precision and often no less cutting satirical humor,2 2 Currie

17. See SIMSON, supra note 8, at 14. As indicated infra text accompanying notes 33 &
36, states' refusals to be bound by one or another traditional rule often have not meant
total rejection of the rule. For better or for worse-and I certainly am one of those who
would contend it is for worse-many states that have renounced strict adherence to one or
another rule instead have adopted in its place a choice-of-law methodology that explicitly
or implicitly takes the old rule into account. See Gary J. Simson, Leave Bad Enough Alone,
75 IND. L.J. 649, 649-51 (2000) (noting the express displacement by the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) of the First Restatement and its array of traditional
rules, and criticizing the many "presumptive rules" set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws as "frequently bearlingl a striking and rather frightful resemblance to
the territorial rules that the Second Restatement purported to lay to rest"); Gary J.
Simson, The Neumeier-Schultz Rules: How Logical a "Next Stage in the Evolution of the
Law"After Babcock?, 56ALB. L. REV. 913,923-25 (1993) [hereinafter The Neumeier-Schultz
Rules] (calling attention to the New York Court of Appeals' tacit reversion under rules 2
and 3 of its Neumeier rules to the place-of-wrong rule that Babcock had seemingly
disavowed, and explaining why a court "could hardly do worse in a policy sense than revert
back" to the old rule).
18. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 282-83.
19. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Cal. 1967); O'Connor v. O'Connor,
519 A.2d 13, 16-21 (Conn. 1986).
20. The fourteen articles collected in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963), appeared in the Columbia Law Review, University of Chicago
Law Review (6), Stanford Law Review (2), Duke Law Journal (3), HarvardLaw Review,
and Yale Law Journal.The collection was published by Duke University Press.
21. The term, "rational," and its opposite, "irrational," were Currie favorites. See, e.g.,
CURRIE, supra note 20, at 100 ("rational justification"), 106 ("rational results"), 110
("irrational results").
22. For a sampling of Currie humor, see the following excerpt from one of his take-noprisoners attacks on the logic of the traditional place-of-making rule:
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mercilessly skewered the old rules and made adherence to them seem
intellectually dishonest, if not willfully obtuse. Currie was hardly the
first scholar to question the old rules,23 but he can fairly be seen as the
most effective.
Second, in those same writings, Currie simultaneously erected for
state courts a choice-of-law structure to replace the one that he was so
vigorously tearing down. Virtually every state high court that has
explicitly departed from the traditional approach has made the
"governmental interest analysis" approach formulated and championed
by Currie a significant ingredient of its choice-of-law methodology.

If the scene is enacted in Massachusetts, the immanent law of the state, which
droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven, pervades the contract, rendering it, if it
is the promise of a married woman to answer for the debt of her husband, wet and
void. If, then, as persons seeking shelter from the rain, the parties move their
solemn charade across a state line, and act out their parts in a congenially dry
climate, what possible difference can that make in terms of anything that
Massachusetts or any other interested state may be trying to accomplish through
its laws?
Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933); Paul A. Freund, ChiefJusticeStone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1946).
24. See SIMSON, supra note 8, at 91. For more on courts' attention to interest analysis
as part of a broader methodology, see infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
Whether or not a state supreme court, in adopting one or another modem approach,
expressly acknowledged or even fully understood its debt to Currie, that debt existed
simply as a matter of fact. Even a cursory review of the citations in state court opinions
adopting a modern approach makes clear the great influence of conflicts scholars in getting
courts to rethink the received wisdom in choice of law. Moreover, as Professor, now-Dean,
Larry Kramer explained so well, Currie was a towering and unavoidable influence on
virtually every serious conflicts scholar of his day, and he continued to dominate the
scholarly debate long after his death:
The late 1950s and early 1960s must have been an exciting time for choice-oflaw scholars. Brainerd Currie published his landmark studies . . . in 1958, and
these had an immediate and profound effect on the field. Within a few years, a
number of other scholars published their best work, either building on or reacting
to Currie....
... Currie's writings-including his particular formulation of a choice-of-law
method-continue to dominate discussion and set the agenda.... Generally
speaking, the work of scholars classified as interest analysts tends to be measured
by its fidelity to Currie, while scholars who reject interest analysis set themselves
in opposition to Currie alone without seriously engaging anyone or anything else.

Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL

L.J. 245, 245-46 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Although it is twenty years since
Professor Kramer made the above observation, his characterization of Currie's place in the
INT'L
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Interest analysis, unlike the traditional rules, calls upon the court to
arrive at its choice-of-law decision directly, not by means of any choice
of jurisdiction.25 The court must identify the policies underlying the
laws in conflict and determine whether the lawmaking states are
interested in effectuating those policies under the facts of the case. A
state is interested in effectuating a policy underlying its law if and only
if doing so would benefit one or more of its residents. If only one state
has an interest in applying its law, the case presents a "false" conflict,"
and the court should select the law of the interested state.
According to Currie, if more than one state has an interest-a "true"
conflict case2 7-and the forum state is one of the interested states, or if
the court determines that no states have an interest, the court should
apply forum law." A number of commentators, however, have made
clear their disagreement with Currie's forum-preference solution in true
conflict cases. In their view, courts should proceed in such cases to a
more nuanced analysis of each state's interest."
As might be expected, state supreme courts have been much more in
agreement on the proposition that they should not be bound strictly by
the traditional rules than on the methodology that they should follow
instead. According to a recent survey, all but ten state high courts no
longer abide by the traditional rules in tort cases, and all but twelve no
longer do so in contract cases."0 However, in departing from the
traditional approach, state supreme courts vary significantly in the
factors that they take into account and in the weight that they assign
those factors.
Only the California and District of Columbia high courts adhere
single-mindedly to interest analysis, and they do so only in cases of
tort.a' Much more commonly, state supreme courts have used interest
analysis as part of a more inclusive approach. For example, in seeking

scholarly debate seems no less apt today.
25. Chapters 2 through 4 of CURRIE, supra note 20, reprint the three seminal articles
that Currie wrote in 1958 and 1959 that introduced and explained "governmental interest
analysis." For brief descriptions of the basic approach, see SIMSON, supranote 8, at 91, and
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1963).
26. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 109-10, 163-66.
27. See id. at 167, 182.
28. Id. at 119, 188-89 & n.3.
29.

See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 6.27

(6th ed. 2010); Baxter, supra note 25, at 8-9; Kramer, supra note 24, at 273-74.
30. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: TwentyFourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 331 (2011). States have been far more
willing to abide by the traditional rules in matters of property and status. See SIMSON,
supra note 8, at 14 & nn.6-7.
31. See Symeonides, supra note 30, at 331.
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to determine for any particular issue the state of "most significant
relationship," the many state supreme courts subscribing to the
approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws consider
governmental interests in tandem with five other "factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law."32 In addition, in their search for
the state of most significant relationship, they look for guidance to more
specific Second Restatement provisions that give presumptive weight to
directives typically patterned after one or another traditional rule."
The handful of state high courts that have adopted Professor Robert
Leflar's approach examine governmental interests in the course of
analyzing five "choice-influencing considerations."" The various state
supreme courts that have cobbled together more eclectic approaches
essentially combine interest analysis with one or more of the factors on
the Second Restatement and Leflar lists" and, in some instances, have
included a default of sorts to the traditional rules."
Whether or not a court takes into account the needs of the interstate
and international systems and, if so, how much priority it assigns to
those needs is very much a function of the forum's choice-of-law
methodology. At one end of the spectrum are courts that limit their focus
to interest analysis. Interstate and international needs are almost
entirely outside their field of vision because interest analysis leaves little
room for courts to consider policies other than those reflected in states'
domestic laws of tort, contract, etc." Because states' domestic laws
(also often called their "internal" or "local" laws) are adopted with
intrastate cases paramount in mind, the policies reflected in those laws

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 188 (1971) [hereinafter
SECOND RESTATEMENT]. For an example of a case applying the multi-factor most-

significant-relationship test, see Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 2000).
33. See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 146 ("In an action for a personal
injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has
a more significant relationship. . . ."). For a summary and critique of the Second Restate-

ment approach, see Simson, Leave Bad Enough Alone, supra note 17.
34. Leflar first presented his approach in Robert A. Leflar, Choice-InfluencingConsiderations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966). For an illustration of judicial
application of the approach, see Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972).
35. See, e.g., Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985).
36. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972). For detailed analysis
and criticism of the New York approach, see Simson, The Neumeier-Schultz Rules, supra
note 17.
37. Essentially, interest analysis allows for consideration of policies other than those
underlying a state's domestic law only to the extent that such policies shed light on the
range of multistate circumstances to which the domestic policies may fairly be understood
to apply. See SIMsoN, supra note 8, at 100, 135-51.
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do not include policies that are implicated only in multistate cases-policies of a sort epitomized by the policy of serving the needs of the
interstate and international systems. 38
At the other end of the spectrum are courts subscribing to the Second
Restatement approach. First on the Second Restatement's list of seven
factors relevant to choice of law is the needs of the interstate and
international systems. Moreover, the Second Restatement suggests
that interstate and international needs generally deserve priority.
According to a comment in the Second Restatement, "Probably the most
important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate and
international systems work well."'o
Somewhere in between lie the various courts that consider interstate
and international needs but that do not regard them as inherently more
deserving of priority than other factors. Most obviously meeting this
description are courts that subscribe to the Leflar approach, which,
under the rubric of "maintenance of interstate and international order,"
lists interstate and international needs as one of five unranked choiceinfluencing considerations." Courts adopting a more eclectic approach
typically call for attention to interstate and international needs and do
so without assigning that factor priority. Although the traditional rules
do not explicitly call for serious consideration of the needs of the
interstate and international systems, they implicitly invite at least some
attention to those needs. This is most apparent with regard to the
traditional rules' public policy doctrine. That doctrine provides a vehicle
for courts to reject the application of sister-state or foreign-nation law
seemingly applicable under the place-of-wrong, place-of-making, or other
traditional rule relevant to the case. However, under standard formulations of the doctrine it limits rejection of otherwise applicable out-ofstate law to instances in which application of that law would be
seriously at odds with fundamental forum public policy.42 As such, the
doctrine tacitly encourages courts to be mindful of the need for good
interstate and international relations.
In light of the importance that courts' choice-of-law methodologies,
particularly since Babcock, have assigned to interstate and international

38. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 927, 936-38 (1975); Gary J. Simson, Plotting the Next "Revolution" in
Choice of Law: A Proposed Approach, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, 282-84 (1991).
39. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 6(2)(a).

40. Id. § 6 cmt. d.
41.

Leflar, supra note 34, at 285-87.
See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918); FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 612.

42.
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needs, one reasonably would assume that those needs would be featured
in a substantial number of high court opinions. Courts' practices in this
regard, however, have diverged substantially from what their formal
approaches would lead one to expect. As others have observed, courts
rarely invoke the needs of the interstate and international systems.4 3
Moreover, on the rare occasions when they do, their reliance on the
needs often seems more superficial than real.
Ironically, an opinion that may well be the best-known invocation of
international needs in a choice-of-law decision by a U.S. court exemplifies this type of token reliance. The opinion is not simply by the supreme
court of a jurisdiction but by the Supreme Court of the United States. It
is Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in 1953 for a majority of the high
court in Lauritzen v. Larsen."

Since 1941, when the Supreme Court decided Klaxon v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.," it has been clear that state courts are, by

far, the primary source of the law of choice of law in the United States.
Under Klaxon, in cases where federal jurisdiction is based on the parties'
citizenship in different states, a federal court must apply the choice-oflaw rules of the state in which it is sitting." Federal jurisdiction in
Lauritzen, however, was not based on diversity of citizenship. Instead,
it was based on the federal question of whether the injured plaintiff
seaman had a cause of action under the federal statute, the Jones Act,
that established a federal cause of action for maritime torts or whether
the plaintiff's rights were governed entirely by foreign-nation law.
Lauritzen therefore was the rare post-Klaxon case in which a federal
court was using federal, rather than state, principles of choice of law. 7
While briefly in New York, Larsen, a Danish seaman, joined the crew
of a Danish ship when it docked in New York. As the ship passed
through Cuban waters, Larsen suffered injury in the course of his
employment. Alleging negligence, he sued Lauritzen, the Danish
shipowner, under the Jones Act, which gave injured seamen a right of
action comparable to that enjoyed under federal law by railroad workers.
Lauritzen countered by arguing the applicability of Danish law, which
provided less generously than the Jones Act for compensation for a

43. See, e.g., Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and
International Policies in Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases under the Second
Restatement and Leflar's Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,70 TUL. L. REV. 2465, 2466-69
(1996).

44. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
45. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
46. Id. at 496.
47. For discussion of the sizable body of federal choice-of-law rules that had developed
prior to Klaxon, see Baxter, supra note 25, at 29-31.
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permanent disability when negligence could be proven. The New York
federal court hearing the case held that the Jones Act applied and, based
on the jury's verdict, entered judgment for the plaintiff for almost
$4,300. After a federal appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court by a
7-1 margin reversed.
Writing with his customary eloquence and flair-who else, in denying
the significance to choice of law of the seaman's place of contracting,
would think to justify doing so with the quip, "A seaman takes his
employment, like his fun, where he finds it"?"-Justice Jackson
prefaced his "weighing of the significance" of seven "connecting
factors"' with a statement of background principles that drew heavily
on the needs of the international system. Thus, according to Jackson, the
applicable maritime choice-of-law approach is "designed" to fulfill the
international need "to foster amicable and workable commercial
relations."so In addition, the approach "aims" at meeting the international need for "stability and order," and it recognizes the importance of
not being "unmindful" of the "necessity for mutual forbearance if
retaliations are to be avoided.""
Ultimately, however, the Jackson opinion is baffling at best in linking
the articulated international needs with the weighing-of-connectingfactors approach to which, by Jackson's account, the needs purportedly
give rise. Indeed, if the Court's weighing approach in fact reflects
recognition of the articulated needs, Jackson's opinion is singularly
unhelpful in explaining the connection. In disposing of one after another
factor as entitled to little weight either in general or in the case at hand,
Jackson says little or nothing with regard to the international needs
identified earlier in his opinion.
For example, in sweeping aside the place-of-wrong connecting factor
as largely irrelevant to choice of law in cases, like Lauritzen, involving
maritime torts, Jackson is content simply to rest on the fortuitous
operation of the place-of-wrong rule in maritime cases. As Jackson puts
it, "The test of location of the wrongful act or omission, however
sufficient for torts ashore, is of limited application to shipboard torts,
because of the varieties of legal authority over waters she [the ship] may
navigate."5 2 By the same token, in characterizing the law-of-the-flag
connecting factor as presumptively controlling both in the case at hand
and perhaps in maritime cases generally, Jackson explains his strongly

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588.
Id. at 582. For Justice Jackson's analysis of the factors, see id. at 583-92.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 583.
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positive weighting of this factor simply in terms of the factor's longevity
and general recognition.13
The choice-of-law approach that the Court applied in Lauritzen did not
fit neatly into the traditional mold. To the extent that the Court's
approach evidenced recognition of the shortcomings of the traditional
approach, it may be seen as quite forward-looking. To similar effect are
intimations in the Court's opinion that the Court is being guided to some
degree by a sense of governmental interests.54 However, with regard to
the Court's incorporation of the needs of the international system into
its choice-of-law approach, there is much less happening of any
consequence than meets the eye.
In short, Justice Jackson's lofty rhetoric notwithstanding, Lauritzen
evinces no more than an abstract commitment to serving the needs of
the international system. As discussed further below, the international
needs identified by Justice Jackson are eminently defensible as
important needs of the international system. Nonetheless, the disconnect
between the needs and the Court's actual reasoning strongly suggests
that the Court was giving only lip-service to those needs.
II.

PRIORITY FOR INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS OR FOR THE
NEEDS OF THE FORUM STATE?

As indicated in this Part and Part III, I regard serious consideration
of the needs of the interstate and international systems as an essential
component of any sound choice-of-law methodology. I part ways,
however, with the drafters of the Second Restatement when they suggest
that a court's primary obligation in choice of law is to serve interstate
and international needs. In my view, a court's primary obligation is to
serve the needs of the forum state, and a court properly acquits itself of
that obligation in practice by proceeding in choice of law with a
presumption in favor of applying forum law.
Although it may seem enlightened for a court to think first about
needs that transcend those of the forum state, state courts are not

53. Id. at 584-86.
54. As discussed infra Part VI, although Currie was responsible for developing the
concept of governmental interests into a generally applicable choice-of-law approach, the
concept did not originate with him. The U.S. Supreme Court had made the concept a
central ingredient of its approach to constitutional limitations on choice of law. See Pac.
Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). Several years prior to authoring the majority
opinion in Lauritzen, Justice Jackson commented in a law review on this development in
the Court's case law. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faithand Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26-29, 33-34 (1945).
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interstate or international fora acting on behalf of the United States or
the collective nations of the world. They are agents of the states in which
they sit. Whether popularly elected or appointed by popularly elected
officials, state judges derive their authority from the people of the state,
and they act responsibly and legitimately in so far as their decisions
further the best interests of the people of the state.
Of course, reasonable judges may differ in particular cases as to what
choice of law best serves the welfare of a state's citizens, but for a few
reasons, forum law is the logical place to start." First of all, regardless
of whether one or more of the litigants in a particular case is a citizen
of the forum state, the forum state always has an important stake in the
court's doing justice in the case at hand. As the best available evidence
of the state's lawmakers' considered judgment as to the fairest or socially
most beneficial way of resolving cases limited in their elements to the
forum state, forum law is a natural choice to help ensure that the court
fulfills its justice-dispensing role. A choice of forum law also serves the
forum state's best interests by minimizing the court's risk of error. Very
simply, because a court is more familiar with forum law than out-ofstate law, it is less apt to misapply it. Lastly, because forum law is more
readily ascertainable than nonforum law, a court serves the state's
interest in conserving judicial resources by proceeding with a forum law
presumption.
When the forum law potentially applicable in a conflicts case is a
forum-state statute, principles of legislative supremacy and separation
of powers reinforce the wisdom of proceeding with a presumption in
favor of forum law. Forum statutes are fairly understood as expressing
the state legislature's view of the optimal resolution of the competing
considerations in intrastate cases. If so, then judicial respect for the
legislature's preeminent role in state policymaking calls for judicial
adherence to the policy balance struck by the legislature for intrastate
cases unless the multistate nature of the case brings into play a factor
that significantly changes the policy balance.
When the forum law at issue in a multistate case is court-made law,
the validity of a forum-law presumption is reinforced by principles of
judicial consistency and evenhandedness. Forum common law reflects
the state judiciary's assessment of the balance best struck in intrastate
cases. Unless the court can identify a factor in the conflicts case that
calls for striking a different balance, the court cannot choose nonforum

55. See SIMSoN, supra note 8, ch. 1 ("Why Not Always Apply Forum Law?"); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-BasicRule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 637 (1960);
Amos Shapira, "GraspAll, Lose All": On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation
of Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 255-59 (1977).
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law without violating its obligation to decide cases over time in a
consistent and evenhanded way.
III.

SITUATING INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS IN A FORUMCENTERED METHODOLOGY

Under the above reasoning, courts are correct not to give the needs of
the interstate and international systems the primacy that the Second
Restatement and some commentators maintain that they deserve. The
needs of the forum, not those of the interstate and international systems,
should occupy center stage. However, as the preceding discussion also
suggests, fulfillment of the needs of the forum calls for serious attention
in multistate cases to factors, such as the needs of the interstate and
international systems, that presumably did not figure prominently in the
lawmakers' contemplation when, with the intrastate context foremost in
mind, they formulated forum law."
To put the matter somewhat differently: If courts in multistate cases
apply forum law without considering the possibility that the needs of the
interstate or international system strongly support a choice of nonforum
law, they risk overextending the reach of forum law. Mechanical
application of forum law in multistate cases without regard to interstate
and international needs gives the balance struck by lawmakers in

56. Unlike the needs of the interstate and international systems, some factors that a
court should consider in deciding whether to apply forum law in a multistate context are
not peculiar to multistate cases. They may arise in both intrastate and multistate cases.
However, because they may take on special significance in a multistate context, a court
needs to be sensitive to whether they should be understood as altering the policy balance
struck with intrastate cases foremost in mind.
One such factor is justified expectations. Justified expectations is often a factor that
lawmakers take into account when, with intrastate cases paramount in mind, they
formulate forum law. However, the multistate nature of a case may implicate justified
expectations in a way that they would not be implicated if the case were confined in its
elements to the forum state. See SIMSON, supra note 8, ch. 4 ("Protection of Justified
Expectations"); Simson, supra note 38, at 291-92.
Another factor of this sort is the interests of the forum state. Unlike justified
expectations, forum state interests do not simply figure in the formulation of forum law on
occasion; they do so all the time. Like justified expectations, however, this factor may take
a very different form in a multistate case than it would take if the case were limited in all
respects to the forum state. Although maximizing enforcement of the forum state's interests
in the long run is only sensibly served in intrastate cases by applying forum law, it calls
for a more varied strategy in multistate cases. I disagree with Currie both as to how
"interests" should be understood and determined and as to the appropriate means of
implementing a decision to maximize forum state interests in the long run. See id. at 28091. However, I very much share his assumption-implicit, if not explicit (see id. at 295
n.44)-that maximizing enforcement of forum state interests in the long run should be a key
objective in choice of law.
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adopting forum law a significance and scope that the lawmakers, with
their attention focused on intrastate cases, cannot fairly be assumed to
intend.
Consider, for example, Ciprari v. Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro," a case
decided in 1965. Alleging negligence, a New York resident sued a
Brazilian airline for injuries that he suffered in a plane crash in Brazil.
While New York adhered to a rule of full compensation for injury, the
Brazilian Air Code sharply limited airlines' liability in aviation accidents
to approximately $100 per person. In holding applicable the Brazilian
ceiling on recovery, the New York federal district court hearing the case
underlined Brazil's powerful interest in protecting its airlines. According
to the court, Brazil's airlines were at the time "'an infant industry of
extraordinary public and national importance,"' and the airlines' success
was, for Brazil, "'a matter not only of pride and commercial well-being,
but perhaps even of national security."'"
In formulating its no-ceiling-on-recoveries rule, the New York
legislators presumably were thinking, consciously or subconsciously, in
terms of the wholly intrastate case: New York plaintiff, defendant, and
accident." Weighing the relevant competing considerations for limited
and unlimited recovery in this intrastate context, the lawmakers
concluded that unlimited recovery was the fairest or socially most
beneficial rule. The international need to decide cases in a way that
would not generate serious friction between New York and another
jurisdiction-a need that would not arise in purely intrastate cases-was
not in the lawmakers' immediate contemplation.
However, in Ciprari, a case that transcended not only state but
national lines, the international need to minimize friction between
nations emerged as a relevant consideration. Indeed, given Brazil's
apparently powerful stake in protecting the defendant airline from
significant loss, the need to avoid international friction seemed to
militate strongly in favor of Brazilian law. Under the circumstances, a
New York court could very reasonably conclude that the New York
legislators who opted for an unlimited recovery rule with intrastate cases
primarily in mind would nonetheless favor the selection of Brazilian law
in the international case at hand.

57. 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd per curiam, 359 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966).
58. Id. at 824-25 (quoting Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense,
350 F.2d 468, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
59. For a thoughtful and colorful articulation of lawmakers' natural tendency (1) to
frame their prescriptions in a way that does not explicitly differentiate between intrastate
and multistate cases, but (2) simultaneously to have in their minds the "undeveloped
image" of the "wholly domestic case," see CURRIE, supra note 20, at 81-82.
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Conceivably, the New York legislators may have felt so strongly about
the policy preference expressed in the unlimited recovery rule that they
would be unlikely to favor a choice of Brazilian law in Ciprari.However,
absent evidence to this effect in the legislative history of the unlimited
recovery rule, a court most reasonably would infer that the lawmakers
would have wanted to give precedence to the potent international need
crying out for attention in the case.
IV.

IDENTIFYING INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS

Although courts and commentators regularly talk about "the needs of
the interstate and international systems," they seem remarkably
untroubled by, or inattentive to, the inherent vagueness of the phrase.
To be usable in any analytically rigorous way, it requires substantial
clarification in two respects.
First, in deciding whether or not something is a need of the interstate
or international system, whose perspective counts? To qualify as an
"interstate" need for purposes of choice of law must the need be one in
the eyes of every state in the United States? Of most states? Similarly,
what degree of consensus is required among nations for a need to qualify
as an "international" need for purposes of a choice-of-law decision? Is it
necessary or sufficient or both that the need qualify as an "interstate"
or "international" need in the eyes of the forum state?
Second, what falls within the concept of an interstate or international
"need"? What constitutes a "need" and what does not, and why?
I suggest that both sets of questions are best answered in terms of the
role that the policy of serving the needs of the interstate and international systems plays in choice of law. That role varies according to the
particular choice-of-law methodology within which the policy operates.
For example, as noted earlier, the needs of the interstate and international systems are of quite limited significance to governmental interest
analysis because that approach leaves little room for considering
them."o In contrast, those needs are highly relevant to choice-of-law
decisions based on the Second Restatement," the Leflar approach,6 2
or the forum-centered methodology outlined above in Part II, but the
needs may figure differently into the choice-of-law decision depending on
which of these three methodologies is being used.
As indicated in Part II, I believe that the optimal choice-of-law
approach is one that has a forum-law presumption at its core but that

60. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
62. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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recognizes the validity of departing from forum law in order to further
policies, such as serving the needs of the interstate and international
systems, that would not be materially implicated if the case were limited
in its elements to the forum state." In exploring below how the concept
of the needs of the interstate and international systems may be refined
in a functionally effective way, I will do so within the context of my
proposed approach to choice of law. The validity of the suggested
refinement therefore depends in part on the validity of the approach
within which it would operate. For present purposes, and out of regard
for current space limitations, I refer anyone wishing a fuller account and
defense of that approach to the 1991 article in which I proposed it."

A.

The Relevant Perspective

Under my proposed choice-of-law approach, the answer to the question
of whose perspective counts is clear: the forum state's. If the case at
hand does not implicate a need that the forum state regards as a need
of the interstate or international system, then the court cannot
reasonably conclude that the state lawmakers would regard the policy
of serving the needs of the interstate or international system as an
adequate basis for departing from the policy balance that, with
intrastate cases foremost in mind, they struck in adopting the potentially applicable forum law. The fact that most states or nations may regard
that need as one entitled to weight in choice of law as a need of the
interstate or international system is beside the point.
Under a different methodology, a court might well be justified in
taking seriously a need that the forum state does not regard as a need
of the interstate or international system. For example, under the Leflar
and Second Restatement approaches, the perspective of the need that
counts is probably most logically seen as that shared by a majority of the
relevant government actors, meaning a majority of the states of the
United States in multistate cases and a majority of the nations of the
world in multinational cases. Both approaches explicitly authorize courts
to take into account the needs of the interstate and international
systems, but neither expressly indicates whose perspective determines
whether something qualifies as such a need. Moreover, although both

63. As indicated supra note 56, two other policies that warrant serious consideration
in multistate cases as potentially justifying a departure from forum law are protecting
justified expectations and maximizing enforcement of forum state interests in the long run.
I have suggested that the latter policy calls for a two-step approach for resolving choice-oflaw problems: an initial "choice of jurisdiction" followed by a choice of law. See Simson,
supra note 38, at 280.
64. Simson, supra note 38.
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approaches call for consideration of the forum state's interests, they
deemphasize the importance of those interests by calling, with no lesser
force, for consideration of nonforum interests.
The Essentials of an Interstate or InternationalNeed
The fact that a term may clearly encompass certain things does not
preclude the possibility that it is undesirably vague overall. For example,
no one would dispute that a statute criminalizing "activities dangerous
to others" covers someone who plants a bomb to go off at noon in a busy
marketplace. However, "activities dangerous to others" obviously also
has a vast gray area that is highly problematic.
The "needs of the interstate and international systems" similarly has
a certain core of clear meaning. As discussed below, few would question
that the smooth and efficient operation of interstate and international
commerce falls within it. Nonetheless, the "needs of the interstate and
international systems" also includes a large realm of uncertain
application.
To diminish substantially this realm of vagueness and to establish a
closer fit between the concept of the "needs of the interstate and
international systems" and the function that it is designed to serve, I
suggest refining the concept in three ways. First, to merit serious
consideration in choice of law, a need must be one that can fairly be
characterized as important. Assume that a court decides to apply
nonforum law based on its perception that to do so would further needs
of the interstate or international system. As discussed above, a choice of
forum law always entails certain benefits: ease of ascertainment, less
risk of error in application, and vindication of the forum state's basic
sense of justice. To justify relinquishing those benefits in order to serve
an interstate or international need, the need must be sufficiently
weighty in the forum state's eyes to warrant description as important.
Second, the need must be one that is distinctive to cases with one or
more elements that transcend the boundaries of a single jurisdiction.
Consider again a choice of nonforum law based on a determination that
a need of the interstate or international system requires it. Forum law
presumably reflects the forum state's lawmakers' considered judgment
as to the optimal balance to be struck in terms of the policies at stake
in purely intrastate cases. For a court logically to reject forum law in
order to serve an interstate or international need, the need must be
distinct from any taken into account in the policy balance struck in the
formulation of forum law.
Assume, for example, that the forum state legislature has long refused
to recognize an individual right to be free from unsolicited and undesired
publication of facts, however truthful, about one's personal affairs. Also

B.
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assume that the court sees this privacy right as a basic human right.
Under the circumstances, the court might be tempted to call the right a
need of the interstate and international systems and to invoke it as a
basis for choosing nonforum law. To do so, however, would be misguided,
because the need is in no way distinctive to cases transcending a single
jurisdiction. In effect, the court would be using the interstate or
international need concept to vindicate a need that the forum state
legislature has already taken into account and has decided does not
warrant priority over the needs militating in favor of nonrecognition of
the privacy right.
Third and lastly, the need should be "systemic" in the sense of being
a collective, widely shared need that must be met for the interstate or
international system to function effectively. Consider, for example, the
smooth and efficient operation of interstate and international commerce-a frequently cited interstate and international need that rather
clearly qualifies as "systemic.'" Individual states and nations have
mutual interests in satisfying this need, and its satisfaction bears
heavily on the effective functioning of the interstate and international
systems.
The free movement of individuals across state lines, which has been
cited as a need of the interstate system,66 presents a closer question in
terms of what qualifies as a "systemic" need. The free movement of
people across state lines undoubtedly has economic repercussions for the
effective functioning of the interstate system as a whole, but those
repercussions appear to be significantly less than the repercussions
associated with the need for interstate commerce to operate smoothly
and efficiently. In addition, the importance of the need for people to
move freely across state lines may be less a matter of the effective
functioning of the interstate system than a matter of individual rights.
In a federal system consisting of various states that have significant
autonomy but that, above all, are parts of a single nation, the right to
travel freely from state to state is readily understood as a right of
national citizenship.
Ultimately, however, in terms of the choice-of-law policy of serving the
needs of the interstate system, the relevant question is not whether the

65. For a sampling of the many sources that have cited the smooth and efficient
operation of interstate and international commerce as a need of the interstate and
international systems or clearly treated it as such, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953), discussed supra Part I; Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 546 (Or. 1964);
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 6(2)(a) & cmt. d; Leflar, supranote 34, at 285-87.
66. See, e.g., Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146, 1152 (1st Cir. 1971); Rungee
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P.2d 378, 383 (Idaho 1968); Leflar, supra note 34, at 286.
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need for people to move freely from state to state is as clearly or purely
a systemic need as the need for the free flow of interstate commerce.
Rather, the question is whether this need has significant repercussions
for the interstate system as a whole. I believe that it does and that
therefore a court reasonably may regard it as a "systemic" need and
treat it as a possible basis in choice of law for departing from forum law.
Lastly, to avoid possible misunderstanding, I should note that even if
I am wrong and the interstate repercussions of this need are too
fragmentary for the need to be fairly regarded as systemic, the need is
not necessarily irrelevant to choice of law. It may well warrant serious
consideration in choice of law for other reasons-specifically, as an
important individual need that arises as a result of the interstate
character of the case. For the sake of clarity, consistency, and analytical
precision, courts should take care in thinking about the needs of the
interstate and international systems to screen out needs that cannot
fairly be characterized as systemic. In doing so, however, courts also
should be alert to the possibility that there are individual, nonsystemic
needs arising out of the interstate or international nature of the case
that merit attention in the choice-of-law decision."

67. Gore v. NortheastAirlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967), provides an interesting
example of such a need. Gore was a wrongful death action brought in New York for a New

Yorker's death in an airplane crash. The law of Massachusetts, where the accident
occurred and the airline had its principal place of business, limited wrongful-death
recoveries to $15,000; New York law had no such ceiling on recoveries. Soon after the
accident and before the filing of the suit, the decedent's widow and their two young
children moved from New York to live with her mother in Maryland.
Applying New York conflicts law, the lower court held that the Massachusetts ceiling on
recovery applied. In its view, the survivors' move to Maryland deprived New York of the
interest it otherwise would have had in applying, for the survivors' benefit, the full
compensation policy underlying its no-ceiling rule. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the New York interest persisted despite the family's move. Citing as authority a New
York case from 1900, it explained that, for purposes of determining the existence of a New
York interest,"the time of death is the crucial time" because "New York considers the rights
of beneficiaries in wrongful death actions to be property rights which vest as of the date
of death." Id. at 723.
Even aside from the anomaly of invoking a rule announced in 1900 to determine the
workings of an approach adopted more than sixty years later, the appeals court's reasoning
left much to be desired. The court would have been far more persuasive if it had explained
that a choice of New York law was appropriate in light of the family's need to move to
Maryland, where the widow's mother could help cushion the economic and emotional blow
that the widow and children suffered from the decedent's death. Although the post-accident
move eliminated any New York interest in applying the policy behind its no-ceiling rule,
New York plainly did have an interest in applying a choice-of-law policy arising out of the
multistate character of the case: a policy of deciding choice of law in a manner that does
not deter individuals from leaving the forum state when to do so would satisfy important
personal needs.
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A Proposed Presumption

In deciding whether particular needs meet the three criteria described
above, courts generally can be expected to have the most difficulty with
the criterion that the need be "important." "Important" is obviously a
highly relative term. As noted earlier, however, "important" is only
sensibly discussed in this context as meaning at least important enough
that the benefits that accrue from serving the need outweigh the benefits
that always accrue from simply applying forum law. In addition, in a
democratic society in which the importance of state interests is generally
thought to be measured in terms of significance to the well-being of the
people of the state, it seems appropriate to think about the importance
of serving a particular need from a similar perspective.
Although these general guideposts provide some structure to
determinations of importance, more seems desirable. Past practice
implicitly suggests a useful possibility. On the relatively rare occasions
that courts and commentators have identified specific needs of the
interstate and international systems, they have mentioned the following
three needs much more often than any others: (1) the smooth and
efficient operation of interstate and international commerce; (2) good
relations between the states of the United States and between the
United States and foreign nations; and (3) the free movement of people
across state lines. 68 I suggest that the high level of consensus that has
developed in favor of recognizing these three needs is largely explicable
in terms of the significant degree of recognition that federal and
international law accord them.
The need for interstate commerce to operate smoothly and efficiently
is recognized by several federal sources. Most notably, these include: the
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce .. . among the several
numerous statutes enacted by Congress over the years
States";
pursuant to its commerce power;70 and the many "dormant" Commerce
Clause cases in which the federal courts have invalidated state
legislation as violating a tacit federal constitutional prohibition on states'

68. See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 6 cmt. d (discussing first two
needs); Leflar, supra note 34, at 285-87 (discussing all three needs); sources cited supra
note 65 (discussing first need); sources cited supra note 66 (discussing third need).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3 (3d

ed. 2006) (discussing various statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause that have
been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years).
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imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce." The need for
the smooth and efficient operation of international commerce is
acknowledged in the Commerce Clause insofar as the clause vests
Congress with power not only over interstate commerce but also over
"Commerce with foreign Nations."" This need also is recognized by a
variety of international agreements designed to facilitate international
trade."
Recognition of the need for good relations between the states of the
United States is implicit in several constitutional provisions. These
include, for example, the prohibitions in Article I, Section 10 on state
activities, such as "enterling] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," that are apt to prove nationally divisive." They also include the
requirement that Article IV, Section 1 imposes on each state to give
"Full Faith and Credit" to the "public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State""-a requirement plainly intended to
have a unifying effect on the states. For recognition of the need for
good relations between nations, one has to look no further than the
United Nations charter."
Lastly, federal law recognizes in a few ways the need for individuals
to be free to move from state to state within the United States. Although
the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to be free from
state-imposed restraints on interstate travel, the Supreme Court has
recognized such a right as implicit in the nature of the federal system
created by the Constitution" and as an aspect of the national citizenship protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In addition, some federal legislation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause has proceeded on the premise that practices that deter
individuals' interstate movement may have significant negative

71. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); S. Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, § 5.3.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73. For discussion of various such agreements, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2d ed. 2008).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

75. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
76. See Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935); James D.
Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-Credit
Clause-ItsHistoryand Purpose,34 OR. L. REV. 224,

241-44 (1955).
77. See U.N. Charter arts. 1 (purposes of U.N.) & 2 (principles to which U.N. and
members are committed).
78. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional right to
travel from one State to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union.").
79. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-04 (1999).
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repercussions for the national economy. Most memorably, in testimony
before congressional committees, federal executive officials relied heavily
on this premise in defending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its ban on
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, and the U.S.
Supreme Court opinions that upheld the act relied on this premise as
well."o
Drawing on the support that exists in federal and international law
for the three needs discussed above, I suggest that courts be guided
strongly in their determination of a need's importance by whether the
need is substantially rooted in federal or international law. More
specifically, I propose that a need's substantial connection to federal or
international law is presumptive proof of the need's importance and that
the absence of such a connection is presumptive proof of the need's
unimportance. I believe that this use of a presumption strikes a good
balance between promoting objectivity in judicial decisionmaking and
allowing judges adequate flexibility to take relevant differences into
account.
I suspect that this proposed presumption, and perhaps my three
proposed refinements in general, may seem to some readers to err on the
side of promoting objectivity. They may see my proposals as unduly
restrictive of judicial decisionmaking, as too much of an attempt to
impose structure on a decision best left more to judges' discretion and
good judgment. In anticipation of this possible response, I should make
explicit an assumption about judicial decisionmaking in choice of law
that informs my thinking and that, in my view, justifies the degree to
which my proposals impose structure on judges' decisions whether to
recognize new interstate and international needs.
Very simply, although I have no doubt that, in adjudicating cases of
almost every variety, judges at times consciously exploit ambiguities in
the applicable rules and approaches to reach results that they prefer for
reasons not articulated in their opinions, I believe that such judicial
manipulation is especially pronounced in choice of law. Indeed, judicial
manipulation has long been so commonplace in choice of law as to
amount to a sort of time-honored, though less than honorable, tradition.
Consider the methodology of place of wrong, place of making, and the
like that monolithically dominated choice of law in courts throughout the
United States until the 1960s. That approach is so inviting of manipulation in its multiple ambiguities and lack of firm grounding in any
substantial choice-of-law objective that some of its defenders have gone

80. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of act and
recounting legislative history); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(same).
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so far as to cite its amenability to judicial manipulation as a reason to
continue to use it."1 Though offered and often hailed as methodologies
providing courts with more meaningful direction, states' "modern"
approaches-most notably, governmental interest analysis, the Second
Restatement approach, and Leflar's five-factor test-are themselves more
than sufficiently malleable to encourage courts to continue to abide by
their longstanding tradition of manipulation in choice of law.82
D. A Case Study in Innovation
Bledsoe v. Crowley," a 1988 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, is one of the very rare cases in which judges rely on an
interstate or international need and the cited need is not one of the
three discussed above. As such, it provides a rather unique opportunity
to examine judicial invocation of interstate or international needs in an
innovative way.
Bledsoe involved a malpractice suit brought in a federal district court
in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, Bledsoe, was a physician living
in D.C., and the two defendants, Crowley and Friedman, were psychiatrists living and practicing in Maryland. Bledsoe alleged that the
defendants had been negligent in failing, during the twelve years in
which he received psychiatric care from them, to recognize that he had
a brain tumor. He further claimed that if the defendants had recognized
the tumor in timely fashion, he would not have suffered the harm from
the tumor-permanent brain damage and loss of vision-that he did.
If Maryland law applied, Bledsoe's suit would be dismissed. By
statute, Maryland required any malpractice claim seeking more than a
certain minimum amount to be submitted initially to arbitration.
Bledsoe's claim exceeded the statutory minimum. Nonetheless, he had
gone directly to court.
The District of Columbia had no arbitration requirement. Under the
District's traditional common-law negligence approach to malpractice
liability, Bledsoe was free to go directly to court as he had done.

81. See, e.g., Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (W. Va. 1986) (affirming the
court's continued adherence to the place-of-wrong rule and explaining that "if we are going
to manipulate conflicts doctrine in order to achieve substantive results, we might as well
manipulate something we understand").
82. For brief discussion of the malleability of: (a) governmental interest analysis, see
SIMSON, supra note 8, at 99-100, and Simson, supra note 38, at 283-84; (b) the Second
Restatement approach, see Simson, Leave Bad EnoughAlone, supra note 17, at 650-51; and
(c) the Leflar approach, see Gary J. Simson, Resisting the Allure of Better Rule of Law, 52
ARK. L. REV. 141, 146-51 (1999).
83. 849 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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With federal jurisdiction based on the parties' diversity of citizenship,
the D.C. federal district court applied the interest-balancing test that the
District of Columbia's high court used in choice of law. The federal
district court held that Maryland was the only interested jurisdiction
and that therefore Maryland law applied and the suit should be
dismissed. In an opinion by Judge Edwards that the two other judges
who heard the appeal joined, the federal appeals court unanimously
affirmed. The court maintained that even if the D.C. interest was not
nonexistent, it was not as strong as the Maryland interest and that
therefore Maryland law prevailed.
Of principal importance for present purposes is Judge Williams's
concurring opinion. Although he joined Judge Edwards's opinion, he
wrote separately to highlight that in his view the same result could have
been reached by a very different route: attention to the needs of the
interstate system. According to Judge Williams, the District's courts
"often turn for guidance" in choice of law to the Second Restatement, and
it therefore is very appropriate in the case at hand to think about
interstate needs-the "shared, non-parochial interests" that the Second
Restatement treats as very important.84
Judge Williams maintained that Bledsoe and medical malpractice
cases in general implicate two such "systemic interests": first, states'
shared interest in "states' being able to develop coherent policies
governing medical malpractice liability"; and second, states' shared
interest in "individuals' being able to take advantage of medical services
outside their home jurisdictions."8 5 He then went on to argue that if
a court carefully takes into account these systemic needs, it will realize
that choice of law in medical malpractice cases should be governed by a
rule of "applying the law of the state where the services are provided.""
Under the facts of Bledsoe, that would mean applying the law of
Maryland and dismissing the suit-the same result that Judge Edwards
had reached under a very different approach.
Though not identical to the systemic need, discussed above, in
individuals' free interstate movement, the second interest identified by
Judge Williams may reasonably be viewed as a subset of that need. For
present purposes, I will focus on Judge Williams's first interest, which
is substantially more problematic.
As an initial matter, I note that this interest seems to lack the
substantial connection to federal law that I have suggested should
determine whether an interstate need is presumptively important or

84. Id. at 646 (Williams, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 647.
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unimportant. If indeed there is such a connection, Judge Williams's
opinion offers no insight into what it might be.
It is also questionable whether the interest at issue has the "systemic"
nature that I have argued is essential. Phrased as Judge Williams
phrased it, this interest in "states' being able to develop coherent policies
governing medical malpractice liability" certainly sounds like a
"systemic" interest. After all, what reasonable state isn't in favor of
coherence over incoherence? Similarly, isn't every state happy to see its
sister states-its partners in the larger enterprise of the U.S. federal
system-reap the benefits of developing coherent policies? The reality,
however, is considerably more complex than it at first appears.
Consider, for example, the different perspectives of Maryland and the
District of Columbia as reflected in the conflicting laws in Bledsoe. In
adopting its compulsory arbitration statute, Maryland presumably was
seeking to reduce the size of medical malpractice recoveries against
Maryland providers and, thereby, to lower the costs of health care for its
citizens in general. Furthermore, as Judge Williams explained, "a state
that seeks to reduce medical costs by reducing the burden of malpractice
liability must be able to assure providers that the state's rules will
actually apply to all (or virtually all) cases."'
In other words, for Maryland and other states attempting (by an
arbitration requirement, recovery ceiling, or other means) to limit
medical malpractice recoveries overall, it is essential that the means
adopted be implemented in a predictable and consistent-i.e., "coherent" -way. Otherwise, insurers will be unable to calculate with any
real confidence the likely reduction in the total amount recovered in
malpractice actions against Maryland providers. If insurers find
themselves in that predicament, they almost certainly will respond by
refusing to lower, or by lowering insignificantly, Maryland providers'
liability insurance premiums, with the result that Maryland will not
realize any meaningful reduction in its citizens' health care costs.
In contrast, the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions that have
not adopted means of limiting medical malpractice recoveries are not
nearly so dependent, for the achievement of their goals, on the "coherent" implementation of their approach. In forgoing an arbitration
requirement and other means of bringing down health care costs in
malpractice cases, the District of Columbia cast its lot with those states
that assign priority to compensating fully the victims of medical
malpractice and deterring medical malpractice.

87.
88.

Id. at 646.
Id.
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Let us assume that in medical malpractice cases in the coming year
involving a choice between Maryland and D.C. law, some D.C. victims
of medical malpractice will not be permitted to enjoy the direct access to
court promised by D.C. law. Instead, they will be required to proceed in
accordance with the Maryland arbitration requirement. The fact that the
District is unable to give some D.C. victims the benefit of D.C. law does
not detract from its ability to give others-those allowed to proceed under
D.C. law-the full benefit of the District's policy of ensuring that
malpractice victims are made whole for their loss (or at least as "whole"
as money can make them). In addition, even if the D.C. law is not
applied in a predictable and consistent-i.e., "coherent"-way, its deterrent
capacity is probably not materially impaired. Indeed, in terms of
deterrence, unpredictability and inconsistency in the choice of D.C. law
can be assets insofar as they help ensure that the possibility that D.C
law will be applied is always a credible threat.
In short, despite its inclusive sound, the articulated interest of
ensuring states' ability to develop coherent policies on medical malpractice liability is not the "systemic," "shared, non-parochial interest"'
that Judge Williams claims it to be. Instead, it is an interest to which
individual states subscribe or do not subscribe depending on whether or
not their paramount objective in the medical malpractice area is
reduction of health care costs. In terms of realization of medical
malpractice goals, the District of Columbia simply does not need
predictable and consistent application of D.C. medical malpractice law
nearly to the extent that Maryland needs predictable and consistent
application of Maryland law. Moreover, as a jurisdiction that apparently
believes that full compensation of medical malpractice victims and
deterrence of malpractice are more important than reduction of the
health care costs associated with medical malpractice cases, the District
presumably is only too happy to throw a wrench in the efforts of
Maryland and other states to develop coherent contrary policies.
All in all, Judge Williams's opinion is admirable for his willingness to
think outside the box of the three most commonly cited needs of the
interstate system. However, it also illustrates the problems that may
arise as judges become more innovative in this realm. I suggest that my
proposed criteria and presumption are necessary refinements of an
inherently vague concept and that they provide judges with valuable
tools for identifying new needs that can withstand close examination.

89.

Id.
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V. ASCERTAINING DIFFERENCES IN DEGREE
If a court finds that an important need of the interstate or international system is implicated in the case at hand, it must then determine how
strongly the need militates in favor of one or another choice of law. At
a minimum, before giving a need substantial weight as a factor in the
choice-of-law decision, the court must be satisfied that the need
significantly militates in favor of a particular choice of law. A 1985
California Supreme Court decision, Wong v. Tenneco, Inc.,so nicely
illustrates the difficulties that may arise in making such a determination.
The litigation in Wong arose out of the contracts between Lee Wong,
a California resident who grew green onions on land that he owned in
Mexico, and H-M-T, a California subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. that
marketed produce. In response to restrictions imposed by Mexican law
on land ownership by foreigners, Wong had put title to his Mexican land
in the name of Mexican citizens whom he had hired to grow, pack, and
ship the produce under his name and label. As Wong's financial situation
deteriorated, H-M-T stopped dealing with him and instead began
sending any sales proceeds to the Mexican growers. Ultimately, the
farming operation collapsed completely, and Wong sued on breach-ofcontract and other grounds. The defendants-Tenneco, H-M-T, and
another Tenneco subsidiary-successfully defended in the trial court on
the ground that Wong's land ownership violated Mexican law. With one
judge in dissent, the California Supreme Court affirmed.
The choice-of-law question presented by Wong was unusual to say the
least. The laws of Mexico and California appeared to be in agreement on
the principle that a contract based on an illegal transaction was
unenforceable." They differed, however, in their tolerance for land
ownership by foreigners. The Mexican Constitution expressly barred
foreigners from owning land in Mexico. Although Mexican statutes
established more latitude for foreign investment in Mexican land than
a reading of the Mexican Constitution alone would lead one to expect,
and although the dissenting judge in Wong maintained that Wong's land
ownership did not violate Mexican law,93 the majority's holding that
Wong indeed had overstepped Mexican law was, at a minimum, quite

90. 702 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985).
91. Although the court did not explicitly make a finding to this effect, it seemed to do
so implicitly. See id. at 576.
92. The relevant provisions of Mexico's constitutional and statutory law are set forth
in a lengthy footnote in the court's opinion. Id. at 571 n.2.
93. Id. at 578-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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plausible. In contrast, California law provided that nonresidents are no
less entitled to own land than residents.94
Arguably, the conflict in Wong between the laws of California and
Mexico was entirely superficial. Perhaps the provisions of California law
guaranteeing non-Californians no less right to own land than Californians were intended only to apply to land in California. If so, then
Mexican law was the only law that could sensibly be applied to decide
the legality of Wong's ownership of the Mexican land.
It is by no means clear, however, that California's prohibition on
discriminating against foreigners in land ownership was intended to
apply only to transactions involving California land. If the relevant
prohibition had been one barring discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, or sex, I suspect that few people would infer that California
would have wanted to limit its applicability to cases involving California
land. Even assuming, as seems plausible, that California regarded
discrimination against out-of-staters as less invidious than discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sex, California nonetheless may still
have regarded discrimination against out-of-staters as sufficiently
invidious to call for application of California law to a California
resident's claim to own out-of-state land.
The majority in Wong assumed that the case presented an actual
conflict of laws: if California law applies, Wong wins; if Mexican law
applies, he loses. The court then proceeded to resolve the conflict by a
line of reasoning that anyone familiar with the California Supreme
Court's choice-of-law decisions of the prior two decades had to find
rather surprising, to say the least. In 1967 the California Supreme Court
in Reich v. Purcell" had become one of the first state supreme courts
to reject the traditional place-of-wrong rule and undertake an analysis
of governmental interests. Moreover, in subsequent cases, the California
high court had cemented its role as a leading court in choice of law with
a series of opinions applying, and working through the complexities of,
governmental interest analysis." Nonetheless, Justice Reynoso's
majority opinion in Wong in 1985 relegated the application of govern-

94. Id. at 576 & n.10 (majority opinion) (quoting both the provision in the California
Constitution guaranteeing noncitizens the "same property rights" as citizens and the
provision in the California Civil Code to the same effect).
95. 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967).
96. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (addressing,
among other things, the relevance to interest analysis of a statute's "current status");
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976) (adopting a "comparative impairment"
approach for resolving true conflicts); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974)
(holding forum law applicable in cases in which no states have an interest, and clarifying
the nature of deterrent interests).
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mental interest analysis to a footnote near the end of the opinion.
Instead, it focused on the situs rule traditionally used in real property
cases, traditional notions of comity, and California Supreme Court cases
predating-by as much as seventy years-the high court's explicit break
with tradition in Reich v. Purcell. Indeed, with the exception of its
solitary footnote discussion of interest analysis-a discussion that has all
the markings of something tacked on after the fact in response to the
dissent-the majority opinion could cause the reader to wonder if he or
she had somehow entered a time warp and was reading an opinion
written in 1925 rather than 1985.
Aside from being rather anachronistic, the majority's reasoning is less
than a model of clarity and requires some degree of reconstruction. It
essentially appears to proceed as follows: The Wong case implicates
considerations of "comity" because one of the key "factors" comprising the
"philosophy behind the comity doctrine" comes into play.98 This factor
is "respect for the sovereignty of other states or countries," 9 and in the
instant case, it counsels that:
Consistent with our duty to respect Mexico's right to determine her
own internal policies, we should defer to her laws implementing those
policies when they are directly implicated in the case at hand. To do
otherwise would unnecessarily upset the relationship of friendship and
mutual respect we enjoy with our southern neighbor.' 0
Moreover, Mexico's policies meet the above-stated condition for deference
of being "directly implicated in the case at hand," because the situs rule
traditionally applied in real property conflicts cases calls for the
application of Mexican law. Very simply, "the land with which we deal
is situated in Mexico, and it is a fundamental principle of the law of
conflicts that questions relating to control of real property are to be
determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is
located.""'
If, as the majority opinion seems to suggest, the court in Wong was
trying to make the choice of law most likely not to "upset the relationship of friendship and mutual respect we enjoy with our southern
neighbor," it made the obviously correct choice. After all, how could
Mexico possibly feel that its sovereignty had been disrespected by a
California court's choosing Mexican law?

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Wong, 702 P.2d at 577 n.13.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 576-77.
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There is good reason to question, however, whether the Wong court
should have given good relations with Mexico as much weight in its
choice-of-law decision as it apparently did. By setting its sights on
making the choice of law most conducive to good international relations
and selecting Mexican law, the court implicitly gave priority to the policy
of serving international needs over competing choice-of-law policies that
militated in favor of a choice of California law. Under the facts of the
case, the priority that the court assigned to serving international needs
may well have been undeserved. At the very least, to be persuasive in
its choice of law, the court needed to make a much more candid and
explicit assessment of the weight to which the various choice-of-law
policies competing for application were entitled.
On the one hand, the court essentially ignored several choice-of-law
policies that in combination militated strongly in favor of California law.
Most obviously, these policies included the policies that always support
a choice of forum law-ease of ascertainment, avoidance of judicial error
in application, and vindication of the forum state's basic sense of justice.
In addition, the policies included one of effectuating California's discrete
interest in Wong in applying its nondiscrimination principle to a
controversy involving a Californian invoking the protection of that homestate principle and California corporate entities seeking to escape the
liability that this principle of their home state would impose upon them.
On the other hand, the court tacitly assigned great weight to the
choice-of-law policy of maintaining harmonious international relations
without making any serious attempt to gauge the magnitude of the
threat to good relations posed by a choice of California law in the case
at hand. At a minimum, unless a choice of California law was reasonably
likely to have a significant adverse effect on good relations with Mexico,
it is hard to imagine that the court was justified in giving priority to the
policy of maintaining harmonious international relations over the
policies that militated in favor of choosing California law. Moreover, by
all indications, the likelihood that a choice of California law would have
a significant adverse effect on good relations with Mexico was slim at
best.
First of all, as the majority in Wong acknowledged"o2 but seemed to
assign little significance, Mexico was hardly unalterably opposed to
foreigners' acquiring interests in Mexican land. To be sure, the relevant
Article of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 begins with a sentence that
sounds like a categorical prohibition on foreign ownership of Mexican
land: "Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies

102. Id. at 575.
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have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their
appurtenances .... "13 The Article goes on to provide, however, that

if certain conditions are met, Mexico "may grant the same right to
foreigners.
Moreover, a Mexican statute enacted in 1973-one
entitled "Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation
of Foreign Investment"-leaves no doubt that, despite longstanding and
historically justified concerns about possible foreign exploitation of
Mexican resources, Mexico recognizes the value of, and need to make
room for, foreign acquisition of interests in Mexican land.105 Whether
or not the dissenting judge in Wong was correct when he maintained
that Wong's land ownership arrangement was entirely legal under
Mexican law,"o' that arrangement was almost certainly not as offensive to Mexican policy as the majority seemed to assume.
Second, the decision in Wong promised to have so little impact on any
Mexican national interests that the probability that Mexico would be
seriously offended by the California court's choice of California law was
especially remote. Regardless of whether the court treated Wong's land
ownership as lawful or not, nothing that the California court might say
could possibly bind Mexico. Mexico was not a party to the litigation, and
its ability to enforce its land ownership policies against Wong by
whatever means it saw fit was not arguably before the California court
for resolution. Furthermore, even assuming, for purposes of argument,
that Mexico's national interests would be materially implicated if a
Mexican resident stood to win or lose in Wong, Mexico still had no
significant stake in the choice of law. Wong was a California citizen, and
H-M-T and Tenneco were based in California as well.
VI.

CONCLUSION: CURRIE REVISITED

In closing, I would like to return briefly to the esteemed Mercer
graduate and highly influential scholar for whom the lecture series that
inspired this Article is named. A nagging question remains: If the needs
of the interstate and international systems are indeed deserving of
serious consideration, how can one explain Currie's failure to give them
a significant place in his approach? A number of explanations are
possible. I consider below the three that seem most plausible.

103. MEX. CONST. art. 27,
104. Id.
105.
106.

§ I.

Key parts of the statute are quoted in Wong, 702 P.2d at 571 n.2.
Id. at 578-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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First, the explanation may simply be limited time. From 1958, when
Currie published the first of his pathbreaking articles on choice of
law,1 o7 to 1965, when Currie died much too young at age 52,'0
Currie was immersed in the formidable task of razing the age-old edifice
of the traditional rules, while simultaneously erecting an interestanalysis alternative to take the old rules' place. Under the circumstances, perhaps Currie was simply so preoccupied with the task at hand that
he never took the time, during the relatively few years that he was able
to devote to the task, to give interstate and international needs the
thought that they deserve.
To be sure, in taking on that task, Currie was hardly starting from
scratch. In attacking the traditional rules, Currie could draw on
scholarly criticisms prior to the First Restatement and since.o' In
addition, in developing his signature approach, Currie plainly benefited
from Justice Stone's introduction of the concept of "governmental
interests" in Supreme Court opinions in the 1930s addressing constitutional limitations on choice of law."10
Nevertheless, even if Currie's task was not as monumental as it might
have been, it was surely sufficiently demanding of his time to support
the notion that limited availability of time may explain his inattention
to the complications that the needs of the interstate and international
systems pose to his approach. Whatever the force of prior scholarly
attacks on the traditional rules may have been, those attacks had not
succeeded in persuading even a single state high court to disavow
allegiance to even a single traditional rule. It was not until several years
after Currie began unleashing his blistering attacks on the rules in law
reviews across the country that the tide of state-court decisionmaking
finally turned.
Similarly, whatever the importance of Justice Stone's contribution to
the development of the interest-analysis approach may have been,
Currie's contribution was nothing less than enormous. It simply could
not have happened without a huge commitment of time and energy on
Currie's part. Stone's attention to governmental interests was surely a
major breakthrough in thinking about choice of law. It was Currie,
however, who had the genius and the perseverance to transform Stone's
insight from a means of defining full-faith-and-credit and due-process

107. Brainerd Currie, MarriedWomen's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprinted in CURRIE, supra note 20, ch. 2.
108. See Latty, supra note 3, at 2.
109. See, for example, the sources cited supra note 23.
110. See Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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limitations on choice of law to a methodology for resolving problems
spanning the entire realm of choice of law.
A second possible explanation for Currie's inattention to interstate and
international needs is that, notwithstanding his obvious brilliance,
Currie had simply reached his limit in terms of capacity to reconceptualize the field. After all, by 1958, when Currie published the first of his
"revolutionary" choice-of-law articles, Currie's thinking about choice of
law had already come a long way from the traditional-rules mindset with
which he, like any law school graduate of the mid-1930s, necessarily
began. It was no mean feat to go from a perspective of choice of law as
essentially about territoriality and the protection of vested rights to a
perspective that sees the field as essentially about the reconciliation of
competing governmental policies and interests.
In effect, Currie had gone from conceptualizing choice of law as a
quintessential private-law problem-one closely akin to everyday
problems of contract, property, and the like-to conceptualizing it much
more as a problem of federalism or public law. Under the circumstances,
Currie surely had stretched his conceptual abilities enough that he could
be forgiven if, rather than attempt to rework his approach to make room
for the needs of the interstate and international systems, he subconsciously rebelled and instinctively refused to stretch some more.
A third possible explanation is more strategic: that Currie's failure to
revise his approach to include consideration of interstate and international needs reflected a conscious decision on his part to avoid complications that might scare off courts from adopting his approach."' Courts
have long cited simplicity in application as one of the major attractions
of the traditional rules.'1 2 Whether or not those rules are as simple to
apply as proponents have claimed is a matter on which reasonable
people may differ."' Currie could not help but be well aware, however,
111. Writing a decade after Currie's death, Professor von Mehren made a suggestion
along these lines. According to von Mehren, Currie paid little attention to "policies that
emerge because of the multistate nature of a transaction or situation" because "perhaps he
perceived that the required line of analysis could endanger the relative simplicity of his
approach." von Mehren, supra note 38, at 938.
112. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 596 (Del. 1965); Dowis v. Mud Slingers,
Inc., 279 Ga. 808, 811, 816, 621 S.E.2d 413, 416, 419 (2005); White v. King, 223 A.2d 763,
766-67 (Md. 1966); see also GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 199

(3d. ed. 1963) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the traditional place-ofwrong rule, and characterizing its "greatest virtue" as "its simplicity, the facility of its
application").
113. In particular, the traditional rules are simple to apply if by "simple to apply" one
means no more than "can quickly be applied to yield an answer." If, however, by "simple
to apply" one means "can quickly be applied to yield an answer that one can rationally
defend as better, in some functional sense, than another answer," then those rules are far
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that courts generally accepted that the old rules were simple to apply
and that courts would be very slow to abandon the traditional rules in
favor of his approach unless they were persuaded that his would not be
materially, if at all, more difficult to apply.
Ultimately, regardless of which of the above explanations comes
closest to the truth, Currie's interest analysis affords the needs of the
interstate and international systems far less attention than they
deserve. Altogether, the needs of the interstate and international
systems occupy a curious place in U.S. choice of law. With the notable
exception of interest analysis, the choice-of-law methodologies adopted
by courts that have departed from the traditional rules generally
recognize that these needs deserve serious consideration in choice of law.
Indeed, the most widely adopted methodology-that of the Second
Restatement-strongly suggests that these needs are the paramount
consideration in choice of law. Nevertheless, in practice, the needs of the
interstate and international systems have figured only marginally in
courts' decisions on choice of law. Even on the rare occasions that the
needs are mentioned in the courts' opinions, they often play no
meaningful role in the final resolution.
Although the needs of the interstate and international systems do not
deserve priority over the needs of the forum, they do deserve more
careful and systematic consideration than they generally have received
to date. The difficulties inherent in identifying important interstate and
international needs and in gauging how strongly those needs militate in
favor of a particular choice of law are not insubstantial. Whether or not
this Article is fully successful in resolving those difficulties, I am hopeful
that, at a minimum, it paves the way for others to do so.

from simple.
Consider, for example, Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn.
1928), a classic case involving a suit against a Connecticut car rental company by a
Connecticut resident injured in Massachusetts as a result of negligent driving by another
Connecticut resident to whom the company had rented a car in Connecticut. Determining,
as the traditional rules require, whether the case should be characterized as one in tort or
contract is certainly simple in the sense that it can be answered quickly, with no
expectation under the rules of any sort of explanation. Determining the appropriate
characterization is far from simple, however, if one is obliged to provide some type of
rational explanation in terms of one or another legitimate objective.
In Levy the Connecticut high court held that the case was a contract case. Applying the
place-of-making rule, the court found that Connecticut law applied, which, unlike
Massachusetts law, imposed liability on car rental companies for the renter's negligent
driving. Although the court's choice of law is easily defended in terms of interest analysis
and other nontraditional approaches, any attempt to defend the choice of law in terms of
the greater logic of a contract characterization than a tort one is difficult, to say the least.
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